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In previous jury outcome research, psychologists have studied 
factors such as juror and defendant characteristics, factors of 
evidence such as the validity and reliability of eyewitness 
testimony, and legal procedural rules. The present study was an 
attempt to determine if intentional evidence acts as a moderator 
variable in juror decisions concerning the defendant, and if so, 
how it influences those decisions.
This study employed a between groups design, utilizing three 
groups. Male and female subjects were randomly assigned to one of 
three groups and were presented with written case material which 
varied in the occurrence or type of intentional evidence.
Depending upon the group to which a subject was assigned, he or 
she read either a short transcript of a homicide with evidence of 
intent to commit the criminal act, evidence of intent not to 
commit the criminal act, or only factual evidence with no 
intentional evidence. The subjects then responded to a 
questionnaire which asked them to make a dichotomous judgement 
between Deliberate Homicide and Negligent Homicide for the 
defendant. Subjects were then asked to rate the defendant on the 
following on 11 point likert-type scales: a)length of suggested
sentence, b) length of suggested parole, c) likelihood of future 
crime, d) defendants level of responsibility, and e) how violent 
the defendant was in the criminal act. It was found that evidence 
suggesting an intentional act led the jurors to suggest a more 
severe verdict, a more severe prison sentence, and longer parole 
for the defendant after release from prison, relative to the 
suggestions of student jurors who were presented nonintentional 
evidence. Defendants associated with intentional evidence were 
also perceived as more likely to be involved in future crime, by 
female jurors, and were perceived as more violent in their act, by 
both male and female subjects.
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INTRODUCTION
History
The field of psychology and law is not a new creation as this 
interest and integration dates back to the turn of the century.
According to Tapp and Levine (1977), this history unfolds in four 
intellectual stages. The first of these four stages, the pioneering 
stage, was witnessed by Muensterberg's book On the Witness Stand (1908) 
in which he applied experimental psychology and its principles to 
courtroom procedures. This attempt, however, was mercilessly criticized 
by legal scholars of the day.
The 1930's saw the rise of the realist stage in which attempts were 
made to revamp the law in light of psychological learning. This era 
gave us the controversial book by Robinson (Law and Lawyers, 1935), in 
which Robinson insisted that every legal problem was a psychological 
problem, at its base. Needless to say, this did not enrich or 
ameliorate the tattered relationship between lawyers and psychologists, 
which was spawned in the previous stage. Robinson, however, had a very 
important insight which was lost during the ensuing debates. He 
observed that Muensterberg's approach of seeking one-to-one 
relationships between existing data and legal problems was unproductive. 
Psychological principles developed in the laboratory couldn't be applied 
directly to legal problems.
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The third and fourth stages of this history (policy making and 
comlng-of-age stages, respectively) were ushered In by the landmark 
school desegregation case of Brown v. Board of Education (1954), and 
June Tapp's 1977 Law, Justice, and the Individual iji Society; 
Psychological and Legal Issues, respectively (Loh, 1979). This 
comlng-of-age stage describes the current status of the relationship 
between psychology and the law. There Is a collaborative effort which 
has been evidenced by an Increasing consciousness that psycholegal 
research requires more sensitivity to the lawyer's point of view (Loh, 
1981).
In general, the history of psycholegal research has been described 
as a succession of Interchanges between optimistic psychologists 
attempting to "redeem” the law, and a defensive legal community 
rejecting the generalization of experimental or laboratory research to 
"real life" situations (Loh, 1981). This tenuous partnership with Its 
occasional outright hostility has prevailed until recent times, with 
each side carrying on "as though the other side did not exist" (Fahr, 
1961). The comlng-of-age stage, however, has seen a collaborative 
effort as was mentioned above. The conflict has also been mitigated by 
the creation and organization of a group of specialists In psycholegal 
studies. Until recently, the majority of those who were writing on 
psychology and law did not have the subject as their primary Interest 
(Saks, 1979). Now, rather than the two disciplines working against each 
other. It Is more common to find that scholars are engaging In empirical 
research which Is Intended to address specific court Issues, as 
exemplified In jury studies.
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Psycholegal Research Domains
Over the years, there has been an accumulation of a large amount of 
varied information concerning jury studies and the legal process.
Monahan and Loftus (1982) recently reviewed and attempted to synthesize 
the major findings of psycholegal research. Their overview trifurcates 
psychology and law into the three functional domains of (1) substantive 
law, (2) ways in which the law actually disposes of individual cases, 
and (3) the legal process. Many variables in this third domain have 
been studied as they relate to jury trial, and include juror and 
defendant characteristics, factors of evidence such as validity of 
eyewitness testimony, and legal procedural rules. It is this third 
domain with which the current research is concerned. (For broader 
reviews of jury research see Gerbasi, Zuckerman, and Reis, 1977; Saks 
and Hastie, 1978; Nemeth, 1981; and Monahan and Loftus, 1982.)
One important aspect of jury research that has not been adequately 
empirically researched is concerned with the effects evidence about 
intention (hereafter referred to as "intentional evidence") has on 
jurors' perceptions of the defendant, as manifested in trial outcome.
It is this question which the current research intends to address. 
Several investigators have studied the effects of intent on attribution 
of aggressiveness (Brown and Tedeschi, 1976; Holm, 1982; Nickel, 1974; 
Rule and Duker, 1973; and Schwartz et al, 1978) and found that intent 
did influence jurors attributions of aggression. For example. Holm 
(1981) found that the attribution of aggression was influenced by "both 
intent and reason." The subjects tended to evaluate not the action, but 
rather its antecedents, and they interpreted a "harmful or potentially
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
harmful act as aggressive if it was intended and/or the actor had a 
reason, such as revenge, for his action." However, these studies have 
not directly assessed the effects of intentional evidence on jury 
decisions.
Other investigators have focussed on the attribution of 
responsibility for one's actions. Most of the work in this area is 
based on the work of Heider (1958), who suggested that attribution of 
responsibility varies with the relative amount of personal versus 
environmental factors. He posited five levels or developmental stages 
through which an individual passes. Each level represents an increasing 
level of sophistication where there is consideration of new variables, 
which may affect attribution of responsibility, at each subsequent 
stage. Level 1 (Association) is the most unsophisticated stage and an 
individual is held responsible for any outcome with which he is 
associated. At level 2 (Commission) a person is responsible for any 
outcome he produces, even if the consequences are unforseen. At level 3 
(Foreseeability) the individual is held responsible for his actions only 
if they produce foreseeable consequences. At level 4 (Intentionality) 
the person is held responsible for any outcome that is intended, and at 
level 5 (Justification) the individual's responsibility for intended 
outcomes is mitigated if circumstances justify the actions. Although 
several researchers have empirically tested Heider's levels of 
responsibility and their relation to outcome intensity (Shaw and Sulzer, 
1964; Sulzer and Burglass, 1968; Shaw and Reitan, 1969), these studies 
were not intended to represent jury situations. More recently, Harvey 
and Enzle (1978) considered the effects of perceived justifiability in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
mock trial situations, but once again the effects of Intent on jury 
outcome were not addressed.
Two researchers who have addressed the question of the effects of 
Intent are Joann Moral and Mary Bartek (1978). They were primarily 
Interested In recommended punishment as a function of Injurious Intent, 
actual harm done, and Intended consequences. It was expected that the 
greater the Injurious Intent and the greater the harm actually done, the 
more severe the actual recommended punishment. Moral suggested that 
Intent, which Is a hypothetical construct that refers to what an actor 
has In mind prior to performing an act, consists of "three sequential 
expectancies having an 'If this, then that' form." This sequential flow 
begins with an actor Intending to perform an act(s) In order to cause an 
Intended effect(s) that will result In an Intended consequence(s).
Moral and Bartek's results did Indicate that recommended punishment did 
vary as a function of Injurious Intent, actual harm done and Intended 
consequences. Mowever, Intended consequences did not Interact with 
Injurious Intent or actual harm done. It was also found that offensive 
actors were judged more harshly than defensive actors, which Is a result 
consistent with Melder's (1958) level of justifiability as a mitigating 
factor. The results also suggested that recommended punishment was 
Independent of predictions of future behavior. Mowever, whether It has 
an affect on suggested parole was not addressed. Thus, Intent as 
defined by Moral (Moral, 1977; Moral and Bartek, 1978) does have an 
affect on recommended punishment.
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Intent has long been an important consideration of our legal 
system. It is an integral factor in discriminating Negligent Homicide 
from other forms of Criminal Homicide, and is at the basis of "mens rea" 
which is an important aspect of diminished responsibility (although 
diminished responsibility has been removed from the mens rea 
requirements of homicide in Montana). As shown above, intent is also 
related to perceived aggressiveness and responsibility, yet little if 
anything is known about its direct affects on juror and Jury decisions. 
The present study addresses this area and examines what affects evidence 
concerning intention has on jurors. The focus is not on intentionality
as related to the insanity defense (fdiere mens rea is an issue), but
rather is specifically interested in criminal cases where "not guilty by 
reason of insanity" is not an option. In other words, when a juror is 
presented with evidence of intent, how does that affect 1) perceived 
responsibility as characterized by a dichotomous choice between two 
types of homicide (Negligent Homicide v. Deliberate Homicide), 2) 
length of sentence suggested, 3) length of parole suggested, 4) 
perceived likelihood of future crime, and 5) perceived aggressiveness of 
the defendant. In the present study, intent is not conceptualized or 
manipulated in the same fashion as in the Horai and Bartek study (1978), 
but rather is defined explicitly as statements made by the defendant 
prior to the crime or at the time of the crime which refered to his 
intentions. Thus, this study combines Horai's three expectancies 
(Intent, act, and consequences), idiere the criminal act and consequences 
(to the victim) are held constant. This was not done in the Horai and
Bartek study. With such a design, the effects of the presentation of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
intentional evidence in a jury trial situation should be measurable.
From this it was hypothesized that more aggressive defendants, as 
perceived in association with intentional evidence to commit a criminal 
act, would be treated more severely by the mock jurors (hereafter, the 
use of "intentional evidence" will refer to evidence suggesting an 
intentional criminal act, unless otherwise stated). Concomitant with 
this harsher treatment, the defendant would be held more responsible for 
his actions, given a longer sentence, receive longer parole, be 
perceived as having a greater probability of future crime, and be found 
guilty of a more severe crime. It was also hypothesized that defendants 
associated with nonintentional evidence (evidence suggesting a criminal 
act was not intended), would be treated less severely by the mock jurors 
relative to their control (evidence of fact only) and intentional 
criminal act counterparts. It was expected that the control group would 
fall between these two groups containing intentional evidence on all 
dependent measures. These results may be somewhat mediated by the fact 
that college students in "mock" jury situations tend to be more lenient 
in their judgements than former jurors (Hinkle et al., 1983), and that 
tdien faced with a dichotomous verdict decision students are more likely 
to choose the lenient verdict (Kaplan and Simon, 1972). However, even 
with such mediating factors, it was hypothesized that the differences 
between the Intentional and nonintentional groups on the dependent 
measures would be significant.
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METHODOLOGY
Design
A between groups design was employed in which subjects were 
randomly assigned to one of three groups. The three groups differed on 
the manipulation of the independent variable, evidence of intent.
Subjects
Subjects were 222 male and female undergraduate volunteers enrolled 
in an introductory psychology course at the University of Montana. Each 
subject received credit in exchange for his/her participation.
Materials
Each of the subjects received a booklet containing an introductory 
paragraph (Appendix A), the legal definition of homicide as defined by 
the state of Montana (Appendix B), a transcription of testimony 
(Appendices C, D, and E) and a response questionnaire (Appendix F). The 
introductory paragraph briefly explained the experimental task. The 
subjects were also told that their responses would be compared to those 
of actual jurors in order to increase prudent consideration of their 
responses to the questionnaire. Before leaving, the subjects also 
completed a demographic questionnaire (Appendix G).
8
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Procedure
Subjects were run in groups ranging in size from twelve to twenty. 
Each subject was handed a booklet containing case material and the 
response questionnaire, upon entering the room. Depending upon which 
group the subjects had been assigned to, their booklet contained either 
evidence of intent to commit the criminal act (Appendix C), evidence of 
intent not to commit the criminal act (Appendix D), or only factual 
testimony without intentional or nonintentional evidence (Appendix E). 
The subjects were randomly assigned to one of the three groups prior to 
the running of the experiment, and there were equal numbers of males and 
females in each group. Subjects read the case material and responded 
individually to the questionnaire, idiere they were asked to make a 
dichotomous judgement between Deliberate Homicide and Negligent 
Homicide. Subjects were then asked to rate the defendant on the 
following on 11 point likert-type scales: a) length of suggested prison
sentence, b) length of suggested parole after release from prison, c) 
likelihood of future crime for the defendant, d) how responsible they 
believe the defendant was for his actions, and e) how physically violent 
the defendant was in the act.
Subjects were then asked demographic questions, and what type of 
jury experience they had, if any. They were also asked whether they or 
someone close to them had been a victim of a serious violent crime and, 
if so, how long ago it occured. When all the subjects had completed the 
questions, they were debriefed about the purpose of the study and their 
role in it. They were then informed that they should not discuss the 
study with anyone, because of the possibility of contamination of the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
experiment. Subjects were then asked to sign a statement agreeing not 
to discuss the study for four weeks, and booklets were collected.
10
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Data Analysis
The first dependent measure is a dichotomous variable requiring the 
verdict choice as either Deliberate Homicide or Negligent Homicide, as 
defined by Montana legal code and presented to the subjects. A 
chi-squared analysis was used to evaluate these results. The remaining 
five likert-type items were analyzed with a 3 x 2 (type of evidence by 
gender) analysis of variance procedure, in order to determine 
differential responses between groups.
Verdict Choice
Of the 222 subjects in the study, 139 chose Deliberate Homicide as 
their suggested verdict for the defendant, and this choice was 
significantly dependant on the type of evidence read,
(2,N=222)=33.52, £=.00005. Specifically, of the 74 individuals in the 
intentional evidence group, 64 chose Deliberate Homicide as compared to 
30 and 45 in the nonintentional and factual evidence groups, 
respectively. As mentioned above, this choice of Deliberate Homicide 
was significantly dependant on type of evidence but was not 
significantly influenced by gender. In the nonintentional, intentional, 
and factual groups there were 16, 33 and 23 males, respectively, who 
opted for Deliberate Homicide. This is compared to 14, 31 and 22 
Deliberate Homicide choices for females in the same groups (see Table 
1). These differences in responding between sexes were so small 
(practically non-existent) that it was not seen as beneficial or 
necessary to compute the exact multinomial or use a log linear approach 
to determine an exact value.
11
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Table  1
Number o f  D e l ib e r a te  and N eg l ig en t  Homicide Verd ic ts  Given 
by Experimental Group and Gender
GROUP
NONINTENT INTENT . FACT
GUILTY OF 
DELIBERATE 
HOMICIDE 
VERDICT
. MALES=16 
- FEMALES=14 
. T0TAL=30
MALES=33
FEMALES=31
T0TAL=64
MALES=23
FEMALES=22
T0TAL=45
GUILTY OF 
NEGLIGENT 
HOMICIDE
MALES=21 MALES=4 MALES=14
VERDICT FEMALES=23 FEMALES=6 FEMALES=15
T0TAL=44 T0TAL=10 TOTAL=29
12
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A chi-squared procedure could not be directly performed on the 
differences between the sexes because of the small expected frequency.
Thus, regardless of gender, individuals in the intentional group 
significantly more often chose Deliberate Homicide over Negligent 
Homicide, relative to the nonintentional group, (1,n=148)=33.705),
2<.00005, and the fact group, (1,n=l48)=12.568, g=.0004. Concomitant 
with this finding, the factual evidence group also had significantly 
more Deliberate Homicide choices than the nonintentional group, X̂
(1,n=148)=6.082, g=.0l4. These inter-group chi-square values were 
compared to the Bonferroni critical values to determine significance 
(Dayton and Schafer, 1973)*
Sentence Severity
An analysis of variance could not be done directly on length of 
prison sentence because the two scales corresponding to the different 
verdicts allowed a different set of responses (100 years max. for 
Deliberate Homicide vs. 40 years max. for Negligent Homicide). Thus, 
the raw data (actual # of years suggested) were transformed into a 
severity score. This score was a percentage of the maximum possible 
sentence. In other words, a sentence of 20 years on the Deliberate 
Homicide scale (0 to 40 years) was transformed to .50 (50% of the scale 
was used). Likewise, a suggested sentence of 50 years on the Deliberate 
Homicide scale (0 to 100 years), was transformed to .50. These 
transformations represent the severity of the suggested sentence and 
were analyzed by analysis of variance to determine differential 
suggested severity of sentence by condition (type of evidence) and
13
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gender. A main effect for type of evidence was found, F(2,2l6)=6.8l3, 
g=.001, while neither gender alone, F(1,216)=.953, £=-330, nor its 
interaction with type of evidence, F(2,216)=.008, g=.992, were 
significant. A Neuman-Kuels pairwise comparison indicated that the 
intentional group mean of .657, was significantly greater than the 
nonintentional group mean of .482, at the .01 level of significance. In 
addition, the intentional group mean (.657) was greater than the fact 
group mean (.578) but this difference was not significant at .05. The 
factual group mean was significantly different from the nonintentional 
group mean, however, at a significance level between .05 and .06. (See 
figure 1 for a summary of these results.)
Parole
The length of suggested parole was analyzed in the same way the 
length of sentence data were analyzed, except no transformations were 
necessary. Type of evidence was again found to be significant, 
F(2,216)=4.860, g=.009, with the Intentional evidence group mean (16.81) 
being significantly greater at the .05 level than both the 
nonintentional group mean (11.43), and the fact group mean (13*08), as 
shown by the Neuman-Kuels procedure. The factual evidence group mean 
was greater than the nonintentional group but this difference was not 
significant. Again, neither gender alone, F(1,216)=2.514, g=.11, nor 
its interaction with type of evidence, F(2,216)=.594, g=.558, was
14
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significant. (See figure 2 for a summary of these results.) 
Responsibility
An analysis of variance on degree of responsibility showed that 
neither type of evidence, F(2,216)=2.630, p=.073, nor gender,
F(1,216)=1.919, g=.l64, were significant.
Future Crime
Data on likelihood of future crime showed a significant main effect 
for type of evidence, F(2,216)=9.532, £=.00027, plus a significant 
interaction for type of evidence and gender, F(2,216)=6.173, g=.013.
The differences between female and male ratings in the nonintentional 
condition was minimal (.3), but this difference was intensified in the 
intentional (1.11) and factual (1.17) conditions. A Neuman-Kuels 
pairwise comparison showed that the mean female response in the 
intentional group (5.92) was significantly greater than males (3.38) and 
females (3.68) in the nonintentional group, at the .01 level. It was 
also greater than the males mean response in the fact group (3.97) but 
not the females, at the .05 level. Female mean response in the fact 
group (5.14) was significantly greater than the nonintentional male 
group (3.38) as well, but not the female group, at the .05 level. In 
addition, although the intentional group mean for males (4.81) was 
greater than males in the fact and nonintentional conditions (3.97), as 
well as females in the nonintentional group (3.68), these differences 
were not significant at the .05 level. (See figure 3 for a summary of
16
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these results.)
Level of Violence
Analysis of variance on perceived level of violence showed a 
significant main effect for type of evidence, F(2,216)=3.848, g=.022. 
Gender alone was not a significant factor, F(1,216)=.996, g=.680, nor 
was its interaction with type of evidence, F(2,2l6)=.342, g=.7l6. A 
pairwise comparison showed the intentional group mean (8.53) as 
significantly greater than the nonintentional group mean (7.61), at the 
.05 level. Although the intentional group mean was higher than the fact 
group (8.03), this was not significant. In addition, the fact group 
mean was greater than the nonintentional group (7.61), but again this 
was not significant. (See figure 4 for a summary of these results.)
18
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Discussion
General Findings
The purpose of this research was to examine the effects of 
intentional evidence (evidence suggesting an intentional act and/or 
evidence suggesting a nonintentional act) on juridic decisions. The 
results suggest that when presented with evidence concerning a 
defendant's intentions related to the criminal act, the evidence 
suggesting intent will Indeed affect juror's perceptions of the 
defendant, and concomitantly, regardless of the juror gender, modify the 
recommended consequences. Specifically, evidence that the defendant 
intended the act will result in more severe suggested consequences for 
the defendant (i.e. guilty of Deliberate vs. Negligent Homicide, a 
more severe suggested prison sentence and longer suggested parole after 
release from prison), when compared to evidence suggesting the act was 
not intended. In addition, evidence suggesting an intentional act will 
cause both male and female jurors to perceive the defendant as having 
been more violent in the criminal act, relative to what they would 
perceive if they were presented with evidence indicative of a 
nonintentional act.
There were significant main effects on five of the six measures 
utilized in this study, with only one significant interaction between 
the type of evidence presented and gender of the juror, which occured in 
the perceived likelihood of future crime scale. This interaction showed 
that different types of evidence influenced males and females 
differently on how likely they felt the defendant was to be involved in
20
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future criminal activity. Thus, the gender of a juror does not appear 
to play a major role in influencing or altering the effects of evidence 
concerning intent on suggested consequences of a criminal act, or on how 
violent the jurors perceived the defendant was during the criminal act, 
but it does, however, affect a juror's perception of how likely the 
defendant is to be involved in future crime. The different types of 
evidence did not significantly alter male subject's opinions of 
likelihood of future crime for the defendant, but the type of evidence 
did make a difference with female subjects. When presented with 
evidence indicating that an act was intended, female jurors tended to 
perceive the defendant as more likely to be recidivistic than male or 
female jurors who are presented with evidence concerning 
nonintentionality. In addition, females who were presented with only 
factual evidence (i.e. no evidence suggesting intentionality) also 
tended to believe the defendant was more likely of future crime than 
males who were presented with nonintentional evidence. Thus, 
nonintentional evidence appears to have very similar influences on 
perceptions of future crime for jurors of both sexes, but the effects of 
evidence suggesting intent, or factual evidence alone, seem to be 
amplified with female jurors and this amplification significantly 
increases their perceptions of the defendants likelihood of future crime 
(relative to the perceptions of jurors presented with nonintentional 
evidence). Precisely how this gender mediated affect is related to the 
other scales is not entirely clear. It is speculated, however, that it 
is not significant in and of itself as the other scales do not show any 
interaction between a juror's gender and the type of evidence presented.
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For example, male and female jurors will suggest very similar harsh 
consequences for a defendant associated with evidence suggesting a 
criminal act was intentional. At the same time, jurors of both genders 
will suggest less severe sentences for a defendant associated with 
nonintentional evidence. So, although juror perceptions of the 
likelihood of recidivism may differ, the actual suggested consequences 
are similar. This supports the findings of Horai and Bartek (1978) who 
also found that recommended punishment was independent of predictions of 
future behavior.
Specific Scale Findings
The results strongly support the hypothesis that type of evidence 
will affect the actual type of verdict given, if the jurors are given 
this choice. Specifically, if given the option, both male and female 
jurors will give a defendant associated with evidence indicative of an 
intentional act a harsher verdict, in this case Deliberate rather than 
Negligent Homicide, relative to defendants associated with either 
factual or nonintentional evidence. Nonintentional evidence has the 
opposite affect on Juror's choice of verdict, in that if they have been 
presented with nonintentional evidence there will be a significantly 
greater number of choices for a more lenient verdict (relative to jurors 
presented with factual or intentional evidence). Thus, when the choice 
of a verdict is left to the jurors, the type of evidence which has been 
presented will be a significant influencing factor.
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Mot only does type of evidence influence the verdict choice, but, 
as mentioned above, it concomitantly affects the severity of the 
suggested sentence. Once again, intentional evidence is associated with 
a more severe sentence, relative to nonintentional evidence. Thus, it 
is speculated that if there is a preponderance of evidence suggesting an 
act was Intentional, then the defendant can expect a more severe verdict
and sentence (at least if the crime was homicide). Nonintentional
evidence tends to cause jurors to suggest less severe sentences relative 
to factual evidence alone, and more importantly, it results in much less 
severe suggested prison sentences relative to evidence indicating an 
intentional act. In this study, the severity of the average suggested 
sentence associated with evidence indicative of a nonintentional act was 
approximately 1.3& times less than the severity of the average suggested 
sentence for evidence indicating intent.
As mentioned above, type of evidence also significantly affected 
subjects suggested parole for the defendant. Once again intentional
evidence resulted in a longer suggested parole for the defendant, which
was significantly greater than suggested paroles in both the fact and 
nonintentional conditions. The fact that the nonintentional and fact 
groups did not significantly differ on this measure is overshadowed by 
the fact that the intentional and nonintentional groups did once again 
differ significantly. From this it is speculated that evidence 
concerning a defendant's Intentions does play an important role in 
determining suggested length of parole, in that evidence to commit a 
criminal act will bring about a longer parole (as well as a more severe 
suggested sentence and verdict, as noted above), relative to evidence of
23
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pure fact or nonintentionality. This may be the result of jurors 
feeling that if one definitely intended to commit a crime, that person 
should be watched more closely in the future. On the other hand, it 
could also just be a continuation of a more severe treatment (as 
demonstrated on the severity of sentence measure). Regardless of how it 
is perceived by the subjects, however, intentional evidence does appear 
to lengthen suggested parole by the jurors. It is important to note 
that nonintentional evidence does not significantly decrease length of 
parole relative to evidence of pure fact, but since evidence concerning 
intent (in a general sense) is usually, if not always a topic of 
controversy in a trial, these differences between intentional and 
nonintentional evidence are of prime importance.
The responsibility scale is the only scale on which no significance 
was found. This suggests that regardless of type of evidence, all 
subjects considered the defendant to be approximately equally 
responsible for the criminal act. Exactly how this perceived 
responsibility for an act relates to jurors suggested consequences, 
perceived likelihood of future crime, and how violent the defendant was 
perceived to be during the criminal act, remains unclear. It is 
speculated however, that perceived responsibility may play a role in 
certain cases, but is not necessarily a central factor in determining a 
juror's suggested consequences or other perceptions. In other words, 
presentation of evidence of intent or nonintent may not significantly 
alter a juror's perception of how responsible a defendant is for his or 
her actions, but it will affect other perceptions concerning the 
defendant (level of violence and likelihood of future crime), as well as
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suggested consequences. Therefore, responsibility does not appear to 
be, in this case, a major factor which jurors use to determine verdict, 
sentence, suggested parole, or likelihood of future crime.
Juror’s perceived likelihood of future crime for the defendant is 
also influenced by type of evidence. In addition, this affect is 
mediated by gender. When asked to rate how likely they felt the 
defendant was to be involved in future similar crime, females in all 
groups had an average rating greater than males in the same conditions 
(not a statistically significant difference, however). Not only did 
females in the intent condition give significantly higher ratings than 
males and females in the nonintent groups, as well as males in the fact 
group, but concomitantly male jurors average ratings did not 
significantly differ based on type of evidence the subject jurors were 
presented with. This may be due to the fact that males found it easier 
to Identify with the male defendant, and as a result did not feel he was 
overly likely to commit a future act, but this needs to be clarified in 
future research, it is also important to note that male and female 
jurors’ ratings in the same experimental conditions did not differ 
significantly. That is, females in, for example, the intentional 
evidence group did not have significantly higher ratings on this scale 
than males in the same group. The numerically higher ratings for 
females did, however, lead to significant differences between the 
different experimental conditions (groups). Regardless of the reasons 
behind this gender mediated difference, likelihood of future crime does 
not appear to be a significant factor in a practical sense. That is, it 
is not directly manifested in one of the other scales which relate to
25
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
how the defendant will actually be treated. In other words, even though 
females tend to perceive the defendant as more likely to be recidivistic 
(especially if they were presented with evidence indicating an act was 
intended) than do males, the suggested consequences are similar. Once 
again, this finding supports what Horai and Bartek (1978) found; actual 
suggested consequences are independant of predictions of future crime.
How violent the defendant was perceived to be in the criminal act 
was also influenced by type of evidence, as hypothesized. A defendant 
associated with intentional evidence was seen as significantly more 
violent than one associated with nonintentional evidence. These 
results, in all likelihood, help explain the results for verdict choice, 
sentence severity and length of parole. The more violent one is 
perceived to be in the criminal act the harsher the suggested 
consequences for the act. The opposite was also true, in that 
nonintentional evidence resulted in Jurors seeing the defendant as less 
violent in the act (relative to intentional evidence), and concomitant 
with this the defendant was given less severe consequences.
General Comments
On several of the measures in this study the nonintent and intent 
conditions do not differ significantly from the fact condition.
However, usually, if not always, the question of a defendant's 
intentions are of prime importance, and as a result evidence concerning 
a defendant's intentions is introduced to the jurors. Thus, that 
subjects' responses in the nonintent and intent conditions do not differ 
significantly from the responses of sujects in the fact condition is
26
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
not, in and of itself important. This argument is believed to hold true 
for all measures in the present study, as the primary differences which 
this research attempted to set-apart and analyze were the differences 
between intentional and nonintentional evidence, and their respective 
affects on the suggested consequences for a defendant. To this end, the 
present study appears to be quite successful. The presentation of 
evidence to commit a criminal act results in significantly harsher 
suggested consequences for the defendant, as compared to evidence 
suggesting nonintentionality, regardless of juror gender. One must be 
very cautious, however, in attempting to generalize these findings to 
criminal cases which do not involve homicide. Jurors’ reactions to 
differing types of evidence may differ significantly if, for example, 
the criminal charge was Assault or Vandalism. It is also important to 
keep in mind that the results of this study alone are not enough to make 
strong generalizing speculations or interpretations. In keeping with 
Loh’s (1981) suggestions, this study attempted to "stay close" to the 
data in order to be more sensitive to the lawyer’s point of view.
It is suggested that future research combine these two types of 
evidence (intentional and nonintentional) to determine how they might 
interact to affect the jurors perceptions of, and suggested consequences 
for the defendant. This would be a more applicable study to the "real" 
world situation, since the two types of evidence obviously co-exist in 
the courtroom (and since we now have empirical evidence suggesting their 
differential effects). It will, of course, be impossible (if not 
impractical) to control for all intermediary factors, such as 
persuasiveness of the attorneys, witnesses and defendant(s), but this
27
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could be minimized in several ways. These findings are only the 
beginning, as little research has been directed at this specific area, 
and they indicate the need for further research to elucidate and clarify 
the actual effects of intentional and nonintentional evidence In the 
courtroom.
28
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Thank you for being here today. To begin this study you are first 
going to read the legal definitions concerning homicide in the state of 
Montana, and then you will read information about an actual homicide 
committed in Montana. You will then be asked to determine a verdict 
just as you would in a jury trial, and in addition, you will be asked 
other questions about the case. Please consider your answers to the 
questions very carefully, as your answers will be compared to verdicts 
returned by jurors in similar cases.
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Montana Homicide Statute 
Under current Montana Law a person is charged with criminal 
homicide if he purposely, knowingly, or negligently causes the death of 
another human being. The following definitions are taken from existing 
Montana Code.
Deliberate Homicide:
Criminal homicide constitutes deliberate homicide 
if it is committed purposely or knowingly;...
Negligent Homicide:
Criminal homicide constitutes negligent homicide when 
it is committed negligently. A person acts negligently 
when he should have been aware of but disregards a 
risk that the result will occur or that a circumstance 
exists.
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On October 2, 1982, Richard Allen and Mark Williams had been 
playing pool in a downtown bar. That night they had argued and Mark 
left the bar after the bartender threatened to call the police. 
Approximately two weeks later, on October 15, Mark returned to the bar, 
saw Richard sitting alone at a table and sat down with him. He 
reportedly wanted to try to make things up with Richard and continue 
being friends. However, a short while later, Richard and Mark began 
arguing again and were soon yelling and pushing each other. When the 
police arrived, Richard lay bleeding on the floor and Mark was standing 
over him. A hunting knife was laying on the floor between them.
Richard died of a stab wound on his way to the hospital.
Relevant Testimony
James Lee, a bartender working the night of the crime, testified 
that Richard and Mark were regular customers and played pool there quite 
often. He told the court that he had seen them argue on other occasions 
and had threatened to call the police during an argument two weeks 
before the homicide. On the night of the crime he called the police as 
soon as he noticed the men arguing because he had already warned them.
Jim Cummings, a mutual friend of both Richard and Mark testified as 
to events prior to the crime. He told the court that Mark had recently 
separated from his wife and she had threatened divorce. During that 
time Mark had turned to Richard for support and they had been spending a 
lot of time together. After the argument on October 2, Mark had told 
Jim that his friendship with Richard was over and that Richard would pay 
for the trouble he had caused. Mr. Cummings stated that Mark would not
37
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bell him any details, only that he and Richard had a major blowup and 
Richard was going to "pay” for it.
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On October 2, 1982, Richard Allen and Mark Williams had been 
playing pool in a downtown bar. That night they had argued and Mark 
left the bar after the bartender threatened to call the police. 
Approximately two weeks later, on October 15, Mark returned to the bar, 
saw Richard sitting alone at a table and sat down with him. He 
reportedly wanted to try to make things up with Richard and continue 
being friends. However, a short while later, Richard and Mark began 
arguing again and were soon yelling and pushing each other. When the 
police arrived, Richard lay bleeding on the floor and Mark was standing 
over him. A hunting knife was laying on the floor between them.
Richard died of a stab wound on his way to the hospital.
Relevant Testimony
James Lee, a bartender working the night of the crime, testified 
that Richard and Mark were regular customers and played pool there quite 
often. He told the court that he had seen them argue on other occasions 
and had threatened to call the police during an argument two weeks 
before the homicide. On the night of the crime he called the police as 
soon as he noticed the men arguing because he had already warned them. 
Mr, Lee told the court that he saw Richard laying on the floor and he 
heard Mark say, "Oh, my God. I never thought it would go this far. I 
didn't mean to hurt him... quick someone call an ambulance.”
Jim Cummings, a mutual friend of both Richard and Mark testified as 
to events prior to the crime. He told the court that Mark had recently 
separated from his wife and she had threatened divorce. During that 
time Mark had turned to Richard for support and they had been spending a
40
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lot of time together. After the argument on October 2, Mark had told 
Jim that his friendship with Richard was over. Mr. Cummings stated 
that Mark would not tell him any details, only that he and Richard had a 
major blowup.
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On October 2, 1982, Richard Allen and Mark Williams had been 
playing pool in a downtown bar. That night they had argued and Mark 
left the bar after the bartender threatened to call the police. 
Approximately two weeks later, on October 15, Mark returned to the bar, 
saw Richard sitting alone at a table and sat down with him. He 
reportedly wanted to try to make things up with Richard and continue 
being friends. However, a short while later, Richard and Mark began 
arguing again and were soon yelling and pushing each other. When the 
police arrived, Richard lay bleeding on the floor and Mark was standing 
over him. A hunting knife was laying on the floor between them.
Richard died of a stab wound on his way to the hospital.
Relevant Testimony
James Lee, a bartender working the night of the crime, testified 
that Richard and Mark were regular customers and played pool there quite 
often. He told the court that he had seen them argue on other occasions 
and had threatened to call the police during an argument two weeks 
before the homicide. On the night of the crime he called the police as 
soon as he noticed the men arguing because he had already warned them.
Jim Cummings, a mutual friend of both Richard and Mark testified as 
to events prior to the crime. He told the court that Mark had recently 
separated from his wife and she had threatened divorce. During that 
time Mark had turned to Richard for support and they had been spending a 
lot of time together. After the argument on October 2, Mark had told 
Jim that his friendship with Richard was over. Mr. Cummings stated 
that Mark would not tell him any details, only that he and Richard had a
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major blowup.
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1.) I, student juror, do find the defendant, Mark Williams, guilty of: 
(circle one)
Deliberate Homicide Negligent Homicide
) The maximum sentence for Deliberate Homicide in Montana is 100 years 
in prison. The maximum sentence for Negligent Homicide is 40 years 
in prison. Please indicate the sentence that you feel would be 
most appropriate. (Use the scale corresponding to your verdict and 
circle a whole number. The death penalty not an option.)
2a.) If you chose:
Deliberate Homicide
No time Years Maximum
served sentence
2a.) If you chose;
Mitigated Homicide
12 " " "  1 ^ ^ 2 0 “ “  “ 2 4  "  “ 3 3 “ “  “ 4 0
No time Years Maximum
served Sentence
3.) How long should the defendant be placed on parole after 
being released from prison? (Regardless of length of 
prison sentence.)
Q———4———8———12“““16“““20“““24“““23“““32“““33“““40 
No parole Years Long parole
suggested after release suggested
from prison
4.) How responsible was the defendant for his actions?
0— 1— 2— 3— 4— 5— 6“““7— 3“““9— 10
Not at all Completely
responsible responsible
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5.) How likely is this person to commit a similar crime 
in the future?
Very Very
unlikely likely
6.) How physically violent was the defendant in this act?
Q— — — I —  ̂—  ̂—  ̂  ̂  ̂Q
Not at all Very
violent violent
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Please provide the information asked for below. Everything will be 
held strictly confidential.
Age__
Sex M F (circle one)
Year in college: 12 3 4 Grad (circle one)
Major:_______
Have you ever served on a jury before? Yes No (circle one)
Have you or anyone close to you been the victim of a violent crime? 
Yes No (circle one)
If yes, what was the nature of that crime? (Explain)
I, (do, do not) promise not to discuss the nature of this research 
with anyone for a period of one month. (Circle one)
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